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SET-OFF BY AGENT AGAINST PRINCIPAL.
'the effort to incite the people to pull down about their own
ears the fabric of the government, in the effort to produce a
condition of "harmony," that they are at liberty to secure a
continent, or if that be too small, a separate hemisphere of
their own.
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In an action for an accounting, between owners of property and their
agents for its sale, a personal indebtedness of one of the owners to one of
the agents cannot be considered, "that," in the words of FOWLER, J.,
"being a transaction between them and him, in which the other defend-
ants are in no wise interested."
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When, i the course of the agency, money belonging to the
principal has come into the agent's hands, and the principal
makes a demand upon him for an accounting, or return of the
money, under what circumstances, if ever, can the agent set
up, in reply, that a debt is due him from the principal?
It is said that "the right of set-off, recoupment and coun-
terclaim, in actions at law between principal and agent, is
governed ordinarily by the same rules that apply in other
cases. This right, however, may be waived by contract,
express or implied, and it cannot be insisted upon where its
enforcement would result in a violation of the agent's duty to
his principal: " JXechem on Agency, § 535.
; I Reported, 32 Atl. Rep. 389.
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The general right of agents to retain, out of money in their
hands, compensation for their services in the same transaction,
is unquestionable; and a discussion of claims by way of
commissions, or otherwise, and their enforcement through the
medium of liens, is beyond the present purpose.
The agent's right to reimbursement for expenses or losses
necessarily incurred in and about the transactions of the
agency seems equally well settled: Story on Agency, Cap. 13;
Wharton on Agency, Cap. 5 ; Waterman on Set-off, Cap. 3.
As to the right of an agent to set-off, in an action by his
principal, a debt arising prior to the inception of the relation,
or during its subsistence, but independently thereof, there is
some room for discussion ; but the law appears to be reducible
to the following propositions:
I. When money is entrusted to an agent directly by the
principal, or is collected or received for the principal, and there
is an antecedent appropriation of the funds to specific pur-
poses, by his express direction, it is held that the agent has
no more right to divert the funds from their destination by
appropriating them to the payment of his own debt, than he
has to divert them for any other purpose.
"The receipt of money for a defined use amounts to an
agreement, on the part of the person receiving it, that he will
not apply it to any other, and, of course, not to his own, by
pleading a set-off:" Smuller v. Union Canal Co., 37 Pa. 68
(I 86o) ; See, also, Ardesco Oil Co. v. Northz American Oil Co.,
66 Pa. 375.
The fiduciary relationship, usually said to exist, is, in this
instance, made concrete, and the agent is a trustee upon a
special trust, actually, if not technically.
In Tagg v. Bowman, lO8 Penna. 273 (1883), which is, per-
haps, the leading case, an agent was authorized to make cer-
tain collections, and apply the money, first, to the payment of
debts due to third persons, and then to a debt due to him-
self, but instead, applied the whole amount to his own debt.
In an action by the principal for the amount collected, the
agent's claim to set-off his debt was disallowed, the court say-
ing that the money, as collected, belonged to the principal,
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and as it came into the agent's hands was impressed with a
trust in favor of the principal, which required its application
to the objects specified, in their order. So long as there was
. anything due upon the preferred objects, the agent had no
right to appropriate any of the money to the payment of his
own claim, for such appropriation would be a manifest breach
of the trust on which it was received.
Where a State government deposited money in a bank, giving
notice that the fund was to be devoted to a specific purpose,
viz. : the building of a canal, it was held that the bank could
not set-off, as a defence to the demand upon coupons payable
out of said fund, a balance due by the State, for an over-
draft of its general account: Bank of the United States v.
MacAlester, 9 Penna. 475 (1848). The court said: "As long
as the deposit is permitted to remain in their hands, they are
the agents of the holders of the coupons to the amount of the-
fund set apart for their payment. It would be a culpable
breach of trust to appropriate the fund to any other purpose,
and especially to apply it to their own use:" See, also, Wes-
ton v. Barker, 12 Johns, 276; Dias v. Brunells' Ezlr., 24
Wend. 9. But, see, Pendergast v. Greenfield, 4o Hun.
494-
In a case where the collector of a canal company received
sums as tolls, which it was his express official duty to apply
towards the payment of a certain claim against the company,
it was held that he could not set-off in a suit by the company
for an accounting, a note held by him against the company:
Smuller v. Union Canal Co,, 37 Penna. 68 (I86O). The money
being appropriated before it came into his hands, he was con-
stituted the agent of the company for the express purpose of
paying it over to the specified persons, and could not appro-
priate any part of it to his own debt.
The same conclusion was reached in a case where a corpor-
ation placed money in the hands of its general manager "for
safe-keeping, and to be disbursed in its business:" First-
National Bank of Detroit v. Barnum Wire and Iron Works, 58
Mich. 124 (I885). See, also, Peters v. Nashville Savings-
Bank, 86 Tenn. 224.
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The consideration of these last cases leads to the next
proposition.
II. The receipt of money in an ofzi'al capadty-e. g.-as
treasurer of a corporation-would seem to be equivalent to an
antecedent express appropriation to the purposes of the office.
Thus, where the treasurer of a church was sued by the
church for funds in his hands, it was held that he could not
set-off a debt due him in his individual capacity, SHARSWOOD,
J., saying: "He received the funds to hold at the order of the
corporation, as their officer, and without such order he cannot
pay or appropriate them either to himself or others. There is
fairly to be implied, from the relation he sustains, an under-
taking not to plead a set-off, but to account and pay over
whatever money came to his hands in that character:"
Russell v. First Presbyterian Church, 65 Penna. 9 (1870).
In Mddleton and Harrisburg Turnpike Road Co. v. Watson,
I Rawle, 330 (1829), the manager and agent of the company
had made collections from delinquent subscribers, and, in a
suit against his administratrix by the company to recover this
money, the defence relied on was that the money had been
expended in the purchase of the debts of the company. This
was overruled, the court saying: "The relation of principal
and agent is well settled; as long as the agent acts within the
scope of his authority, and no longer, he is protected. It was
the duty of Watson to collect and pay over the funds as they
came to his hands. It was for the company to direct the
application of the money, when in the treasury, or under their
control, to whatever purposes they might suppose most bene-
ficial to the corporation. This they have been prevented from
doing, by an assumption of power by their agent, and a mis-
application of the funds of the company. . . A principal
may give special authority to his agent to settle and liquidate
his debts, and this is frequently done; but previous to the
introduction of such a defence, to a suit brought for money
had and received as agent, the special authority should be
shown."
The treasurer of a borough was not allowed to set-off, in
the settlement of his accounts, a bond held by him for money
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loaned to the borongh : Todd v. Borough of Patterson, 55 Pa.
496 (1867). It was held that the subject of the settlement
must be his official receipts and disbursements, and that he
was chargeable with money coming into the treasury by way
of loan, whether from himself or others. "As treasurer, he
could not know what reason the council might have for
refusing payment; and he could not, by his own act, deter-
mine any defence the council might have, in his own favor, as
-the holder of the bond. The sum of the matter is, that, as an
officer, he could not obtain a credit for the disbursement to the
bond held by himself as an unofficial person; in short, without
an order of council. He could neither deprive the borough of
its defence, nor speculate in his official capacity upon the claim
preferred against it. . . As treasurer, the case was rightly
decided against him. As a creditor of the borough, he can pro-
ceed as any other creditors may do, if the debts be valid." See,
-also, Prewettv. 31arsh, I Stewart & Pater, 17; Harperv. Howard,
3 Ala. 284; .ilson v. Lewistown, I Watts & Serg. 428; Coln.
v. Rodes, 5 Mont. 318 ; Waterman on Set-off, § 19o.
III. Where, then, the relationship is such that the funds
are held upon a trust for specific purposes, the rule seems to
be well settled.
It is hornbook law that a trustee cannot, on the subject of
the trust, act for his own benefit, to his principal's detriment.
See Parkist v. Alexander, I Johns. Ch. 394 ; Story on Agency,
Cap. IV., etc., etc.
Furthermore, it is a fundamental principle of the doctrine of
set-off, that the debts as to which the right is claimed must
be due in the same capacity.
Against a claim for a debt due by a trustee in his fiduciary
capacity, he cannot set-off a debt due to him individually:
Tagg v. Bowman, 99 Pa. 376 (1882); First Natl. Bank of
Detroit v. Barnum TWire Works, 58 Mich. 124 (I885); Scam-
mon v. Kimball, 92 U. S. 362 ; Daniel v. Wall, 4 S. E. 271
(Ga. 1888); Shearman v. Morris, 24 Atl. 313 (Pa. 1892);
Sticking v. Clement, 7 Gray 170; Richbourg v. Richbourg, I
Harp. Eq. (S. Car.) 168; Bradshaw's Appeal, 3 Grant, 109,
and other cases too numerous for citation.
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But, although the relation of principal and agent is, in gen-
eral language, said to be a fiduciary one, yet it is not invari-
ably so, in all senses. In Spalding v. Mattingly ct al., I
S. W. 488 (Ky. 1886) it was said: "The equitable rule which
prevents an agent from dealing with his principal's property
for his own benefit, inconsistent with the interest of the prin-
cipal, applies only to agents who are relied upon for counsel
and direction, and whose employment is rather a trust than a
service, or both, and not to those who are employed merely
as instruments in the performance of an appointed service."
IV. As to the case where an agent makes a collection, sells
goods, or receives money on deposit from the principal, and
there it neither an express appropriation of the funds, nor an
official position and duty, the authorities are not in harmony,
and no general rule can be laid down.
Agents, as to this subject, may be divided into three classes:
(I) Attorneys, or other agents, who make collections for their
principals; (2) Bankers, or others, receiving money on general
deposit; (3) Factors and brokers, who sell goods of their
principals and receive the price.
The general rule applies to all these classes, that "the agent
is bound to account to his principal for all money and prop-
erty which may come into his hands during and by virtue of
the agency:" Mechem, § 522.
And "an agent authorized to collect and transmit funds to
his principal, has no implied authority to enter into any con-
tract concerning the money in his hands :" Mfechem, § 384.
Does this general duty to account and transmit amount to
such a destination of the money as to prevent the agent from
setting-off his individual debt?
The only authorities which are to be found, are not con-
clusive of the question.
On the one hand, it has been held, in Indiana, that, where
an attorney was sued for money collected, he might set-off a
note held by him, executed by his client: N1oble v. Learj', 37
Ind. 186 (1871). It having been argued that, on account of
the existence of, the relation of principal and agent, the
attorney could not purchase the note and set it off, the court
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said: "The appellee deduces this principle from the rule that
the agent cannot place himself in a position adverse, or in
opposition to the interest of the principal. We have not
found any case exactly like this. Recurring, however, to the
works on the subject of agency, we find the rule to be this, that,.
in matters touching the agency, agents cannot act so as to bind
their principals, where they have an adverse' interest: Story,
§ 21o. The purchase ofthenote in this case, was, so far as we can
see, in no way connected with the agency. We see no reason
why, if the defendant had sued on the note which he pur-
chased, [the client] could not have met the claim by an answer
of set-off, on account of the liability of the defendant to him
for the money collected. Nor can we, on the other hand, see
any legal reason why, when [the client] sues the defendant for
the money collected, he cannot use the note as a set-off, to
that extent, against the demand for the money. . . . It is
not claimed that there is anything in the nature of this par-
ticular agency which requires it to be distinguished from any
other agency; but it is insisted that the rule contended for
applies to all agencies where it is the duty of the agent to
account for money received by him for his principal. Could
it be successfully asserted that the defendant could not have
sued on the note, even while he yet held the money collected
for him in his hands? We think not."
Whether the conclusion here reached be correct or not, the
reasoning ig obviously bad. There is a confusion of thought,
in arguing as though the agent's alleged breach of duty lay
in his purchase of the note, and not in his endeavor to use it
in a particular way. There is a petitio princifii in assuming
that the client would have had the right to set-off the claim
for money collected, in a suit on the note. And, finally, there
is an error of law in the proposition that, because the holder
of the note would have had a right to bring suit upon it, he-
must, therefore have had the right to set it off.
On the other side is the Pennsylvania case of Simpson v.
Pinkerton et aL, I0 W. N. C. 423 (i88i), where an attorney
who had collected a claim for damages to real property, was.
not allowed to set-off against a claim for this amount, a sum
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due him by the owner of the property on bonds and coupons
secured by a mortgage on the same property.
The opinion was per curiam, the court saying only: "We
think it is very clear that an attorney-at-law, or in fact,
employed to collect a claim, when he has received or recov-
ered the money, has no right to set-off an antecedent debt or
claim in his own right against his constituent. He ought to
show in such case that his constituent expressly agreed that
he might retain his demand out of the money." This certainly
seems more in harmony with the whole theory of the subject.
In the case of Reed v. Penrose's Erecutrix, 36 Pa. 214
(i86O), funds of a corporation had been deposited by the
treasurer with a banker, who was also the president of the
corporation, under an agreement to pay interest and to hold
the money subject to call. On attachment-execution against
the company, the banker was made garnishee, and sought to
set-off bonds of the company held by him. The court below
held that this could not be allowed, and the judgment was
affirmed on other grounds, without any opinion of the majority
of the court on this point.
In *the subsequent case of Fox et al. v. Reed, 3 Grant, 81,
involving substantially the same set of facts, the Supreme
Court held that, as against third parties, the set-off was rightly
refused the court saying: " It would be a breach of the con-
fidence reposed in him as depositary, as president, and as co-
corporator, for him to take such an advantage of his position."
Yet the opinion of STRONG, J., in the former case, remains
of interest and value. He maintained that the set-off should
have been permitted, saying: "This right of defalcation is a
legal right, secured to a defendant in all cases where he holds
demands against a plaintiff, due in the same right, and due at
the time when the suit was commenced against him. I
agree that he may, by express contract, preclude himself from
pleading a set-off. Such a contract, founded on consideration,
would bind him. And I think a defendant may also
debar himself from using a set-off by a contract not express.
Thus, if he receives money delivered to him for his application
to a particular use, his receipt may amount to an agreement
SET-OFF BY AGENT AGAINST PRINCIPAL.
not to apply it to any other use, and of course not to his own,
by pleading a set-off. The case of Bank v. Macalester
[suiPra], goes no further than this. But, while I admit that a
defendant may bar himself from using a set-off by contract,
either express or implied, I deny that he can be deprived of
his legal right to defalcate, by anything less than a contract.
In the present case there is no allegation of any express con-
tract not to plead a set-off. The only question, therefore, is
whether one is to be inferred from the transactions between
the debtor and garnishee. It is hardly necessary to say that.
it is not to be implied from the intention or expectation of the
creditor at the time when the debt due him was created, nor
from the inconvenience to which he may be subjected if the
set-off be allowed. . No doubt the company had no
expectation that the president would retain the funds deposited
with him under any claim of set-off. No doubt his having
done so would have embarrassed them, but they exacted no
agreement from him not to plead it; they relied upon what
was at most an honorary obligation. He was the banker of
the company and received the money in the ordinary course
of business as a banker. But is a banker bound to answer
the checks of a depositor when he holds the depositor's notes
or bonds part due ? The contrary has been held again and
again: Davis v. Bowsher, 5 T. R. 492; Rogerson v. Ladbroke,
I Bing. 94; Bank v. Armstrong, 4 Dev. 524; Albany Com-
mercial Bank v. Hughes, 17 Wend. 94.
Nor is there anything in the receipts which R. signed, from
which can be inferred a promise not to defalcate. Most of
them are mere acknowledgments, that sums of money, being
canal funds, had come to his hands, "to be accounted for
when required." Is that anything more than a promise to.
pay on demand? One recites that the sum received was the
amount appropriated by said company for rebuilding [certainj
aqueducts, upon which he was to pay interest until called for.
This is a mere description of the ownership of the fund, and
an identification of it. It was not itself an appropriation, nct
a receipt by the banker for the purpose designated, as was the
case in Bank v. Macalester. Reed as banker had nothing to
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do with its appropriation, assumed no agency for any such
purpose. His only engagement was to pay the company. Of
course, then, there having been no stipulated use, he was free
to use the set-off. .. . His presidency did not prevent his
making any contract with the company, and he did contract
as banker. . . . I have failed to discover any evidence of a
contract, express or implied, that the garnishee would not
plead the statute of defalcation, and I cannot but think that a
denial to him of the right of set-off is enforcing what is only
an honorary obligation in a court of law. . . . I repeat that
set-off is a legal right, and, though it may be waived, no one
can be compelled to waive it, except by the force of his own
contract. And this contract must be positive and unequivocal.
. . . Of course, I am not speaking of cases of fraud, nor of
those peculiar and technical trusts cognizable only in a court
of equity, in opposition to which, set-off can never avail. This
is no such case."
It is enough to say that the rule stated, as to bankers, is
undoubtedly correct. The subject is not one for discussion in
this place.
The class of agents embracing factors and brokers, who
have custody of the property of the principal, presents some-
interesting questions.
The general rule seems to be, that "factors, agents and
brokers acting as such, and having the custody of money or
property belonging to a-principal, act in a fiduciary capacity,.
and are for that reason held to a strict liability:" Edwards on
Baihnents, § 184, and cases.
It may be well to premise, that, whatever rights of set-off
such agents may have, they cannot be enforced through the
medium of liens. The factor's or broker's lien "does not
extend to other independent debts contracted before and with-
out reference to the agency:" Story on Agency, § 376;
Wharton on Agency, §§ 768, 818; M3echeni on Agency,
§ 1032, and cases cited; Drinkwater v. Goodsvin, Cowp. 251 ;
Houghton v. ZfMatheus, 3 Bos. & P. 485; iLv parte Shank, I
Ark. 234 ; W'alker v. Buck, 6 T. R. 258; Vudd v. Burrows,
91 U. S. 426; Stevens v. Robins, 12 Mass. 182.
SET-OFF BY AGENT AGAINST PRINCIPAL.
'- Though a factor may sell and bind his principal, he can-
-not pledge the goods as a security for his own debt :" 2 Kent
Com. 625, and cases cited; Mechem, § 324, and cases cited.
"The factor cannot confer title, even uppn a bona fide
iholder, by turning out the principal's goods in payment of his
,own debts, even though the accounts between the principal
and the factor may be in the factor's favor; Mfeclem, § 996;
Benny v. Rhodes, 18 Md. 147 ; Holton v. Smith, 7 N. H. 446;
Warner v. Martin, I I How. (U. S.) 209.
In Key et al. v. Flint, 8 Taunt. 21 (1817), A, previous to
bankruptcy, deposited a bill of exchange with B, not upon his
general account, but for the specific purpose of raising money
thereon. In trover by his assignees, they having tendered the
amount advanced, it was held that B could not set-off the
amount due him on the general balance.
DALLAS, J., held that this was not a case of "mutual
,credits" within the bankrupt law (5 Geo. 2, c. 30), saying:
"Mutual credit must mean mutual trust; and this attempt of
the defendant appears to me a gross breach of trust. The bill
of exchange which forms the subject of the present action was
entrusted to the defendant for a specific purpose, with an
express understanding that it was not to go into the general
account." See, also, Buchauan et al. v. Findlay et al., 9 B. &
C. 738 (1829), and cases there cited, under the same statute.
The case of McGillivray v. Simpson, unreported, but given
in a note to 9 B. & C. 746, was an action against a broker for
the proceeds of some timber sold by him on account of bank-
rupts. It appeared that the timber was placed in his hands
for sale, upon his promising to pay over the proceeds, deduct-
ing his commissions. The defendant sold the timber, and then
claimed to retain out of it a debt due him from the bankrupts;
and it was held that he might do so. This case is cited with
approval by Lord TENTERDEN in Buchanan v. Findlay, supra,
and seems to be the only decision extant on the precise point.
It was, to be sure, a decision under the express provisions
of a statute, but these were simply, that, when there had been
mutual credits or mutual debts between the bankrupt and
any other person, one debt might be set-off against the other:
S32o
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5 Geo. 2, C. 30, § 28. And "the same mutuality of credit is
required in the case of setting off credits under the bankruptcy
laws, as is required in order that debts may be set-off under
the ordinary statutes of set-off": 22 American and English
Cyclopaedia, 265, Tit. Set-off; 8 Bac. Abr. 651 ; Stanifortk v.
Fellows, I Marsh. 184.
In a recent case, where the plaintiff had entrusted horses to
the defendant to sell at auction, it was held, in an action for
their price, that the defendant could not set-off damages caused
by one of the horses running away and injuring property of a
third person: Oberholtzer v. Heist, i6 At. 804 (Pa. 1889).
V. In jurisdictions where the right of set-off is confined to
items growing out of the contract or transaction on which suit
is brought, the agent's right will of course be limited.
Thus, where the defendant, having acted as agent for the
plaintiff, in the sale of certain goods, gave his note for the
balance due upon a settlement of their accounts, in action on
the note, he was held entitled to set-off against it only the
amount due him by plaintiff as commissions on sales made by
him, and not commissions for other acts, such as collections :
Jackson v. Tate, 2 South. 97 (Ala. 1887). See, also, Clark's
Grove Guano Co. v. Appling, 33 W. Va. 470 (1890).
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